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Abstract. The present paper develops a model of endogenous policy making where a 'low
regulation' party / and a 'high regulation' party h compete for campaign contributions spent
by a dominating low-cost firm within a regulated industry. The model shows that assuming
an endogenous market structure reinforces the economic impacts of lobbying activities com-
pared to the case of a fixed number of firms. In particular, political competition can lead to a
level of regulation where all firms using the high-cost technology decide to leave the market
such the dominating firm becomes a monopolist. This outcome is c.p. the more likely, the
larger the cost differential between the lobbying firm and its high-cost competitors is, and the
less external financial sources like, e.g., governmental grants are available to the political
parties. Moreover, ideological'constraints that prevent the low regulation party from taking up
its equilibrium position will also increase the probability of monopolisation.
The authors are solely responsible for the contents of each Kiel Working Paper. Since the
series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form, interested readers are requested to direct
criticism and suggestions directly to the authors and to clear any quotations with them.1. Introduction
Conventional wisdom usually assumes that industry lobbying aims at erecting entry
barriers against potential competitors or at preventing the introduction of costly regu-
lations such as, e.g., product norms and emission standards. In reality, however, it can
sometimes be observed that certain firms within an industry behave atypically in that
they lobby for a tightening of regulations.
1 As pointed out by OSTER [1982], the reason
for this kind of strategic lobbying behaviour lies in the fact that administrative regula-
tions often impose different costs on different firms within the same industry.
2 Yet,
most of the theoretical literature on the economics of lobbying neglects this aspect by
assuming that the industry under consideration can be treated as a single coalition with
the same interest.
3 A recent exception is an article by MlCHAELIS [1994] who analyses
the political impact of strategic lobbying by combining the so-called "interest group
cum electoral competition"-approach of endogenous policy making
4 with a heteroge-
neous Cournot-Nash-Oligopoly where the number of firms is fixed. However, a change
in regulations due to lobbying activities may also change the market structure by at-
tracting new firms or by driving out some of the old firms.
5 The present paper therefore
extends the above mentioned analysis to the case of an endogenous market structure.
It will be shown that the occurrence of strategic lobbying becomes even more likely if
one (partially) allows for market entry and exit. Moreover, it will turn out that assum-
1 A recent example is the call of the German Volkswagen AG for regulations concerning the
fuel consumption of automobiles (see, e.g., HANDELSBLATT, June 24,1994).
2 See also SALOP AND SCHEFFMAN [1983] on "raising rivals
1 costs" versus predatory pricing.
3 See, e.g., URSPRUNG [1991], MOORE AND SURANOVIC [1993], and GROSSMAN AND HELP-
, MAN [1994].
4 This approach origins in the work of HlLLMAN AND URSPRUNG [1988] and MAGEE ET AL.
[1989].
>5 Concerning the impact of environmental regulations on plant size and market structure
see, e.g., PASHIGIAN [1983] for an empirical analysis and CONRAD AND WANG [1994] for
a recent theoretical contribution.ing an endogenous market structure reinforces the economic impact of lobbying ac-
tivities. In particular, political competition in the presence of strategic lobbying can
lead to a monopolisation of the industry under consideration.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, and Section 3 dis-
cusses the impact of regulation on the market structure as well as the conditions that
must be satisfied to give rise for strategic lobbying. Based on these results, Section 4
analyses the characteristics of the political equilibrium in the presence of strategic lob-
bying activities, and Section 5 closes the paper with a summary of the main results and
a discussion of possible extensions.
2. The model
The starting point of the analysis is a modified version of a model initially developed
by MlCHAELIS (1994). Consider a situation of electoral competition between two parties
i=h,l. Each of them announces a policy programme which includes a certain regulation
thdt imposes costs on the industry under consideration. The level of regulation proposed
by party i is denoted by S[. In determining their programme, both parties apply lexico-
graphic preferences that cover their probability of election, w-x, as well as the degree of
compliance with their ideological orientation. More precisely, each party chooses S[ as
to maximise wz-. If, however, several programmes imply the same w;, party h (the 'high
regulation'-party) prefers the programme with the highest level of regulation, whereas
party /(the 'low regulation
1-party) prefers the programme with the lowest level of regu-
lation. Both parties announce their programmes simultaneously and after this, there is
no more possibility to deviate from the initial position.
6
The latter assumption excludes the possibility of "policy duplication" by the candidate who
turns out to have the lower probability of election. For a discussion of this point see
HOFER AND WOODRUFF [1994] and the reply by HILLMAN AND URSPRUNG [1994].The regulation levels proposed by the parties have to comply with a set of legal and
technical constraints that constitutes a lower bound £2*0 and an
: upper' bound J >s. Ad-
ditionally, both parties are restricted by ideological constraints: party h is not allowed
to propose a level of regulation that is lower than §^ (gh^s), and party / is not allowed
to propose a level of regulation that is higher than 1/ (sy <; I). The probability of win-
ning the election, w2-, depends on the share of campaign contributions Z/ received by




 Wi [0.5 ifzl + zh=o.
The coefficient x;>0 denotes the relative productivity of campaign contributions. E.g.,
xpXfr would imply that one Dollar spent by party / "buys more votes" than one Dollar
spent by party h. Campaign contributions Z; are composed of z;, the amount of finan-
cial support received from the industry under consideration, and zf, the amount of fi-
nancial support received from other sources: Zf- =zf +Zj. It is assumed that there are no
strategic interactions between the industry under consideration and other donors of
campaign contributions. Consequently, z% and zf are exogenous, whereas z^ and 27
depend on the chosen level of regulation sz-. In determining s; the parties play a Nash-
game, i.e. each party chooses sz- as to maximise wr- under the assumption that the other
party's S; is given. To connect this political part of the model with its economic part
(see below), the analysis follows MAGEE ET AL. [1989] and assumes that the parties act
as Stackelberg leader, i.e. in determining s; they anticipate the lobbying payments from
the regulated industry.
The industry under consideration is composed of two types of firms which produce a
homogenous good: a single firm 1 that produces the output y1 and n identical firms k=
2,3,...,n+l that produce the aggregate output nyk. Production, cost of firm j (j=l,k)
7 are
7 Note that the index 'j' refers to all firms j=l,2,..,n+l, whereas the index 'k
1 refers only to
the n identical firms k=2,3,..,n+l.composed of fixed cost F:2:0 and constant marginal cost c.-(s) that depend on the level of
regulation: dcj(s)/ds>0. It is assumed that firm 1 has innovated a superior technology
that guarantees ci(s)<cjc(s) and dci(s)Ids<dcji(s)Ids for any se [s,s]. Except for the
patent held by firm 1 for its new technology, there are no barriers to entry.
Aggregate output is denoted by y:=y\ + n-y/c
 and market demand is given by the linear
inverse demand function p(y) = a-h-y. For any given level of regulation s, each firm j
maximises its profit Kj(s)=\p(y)-cj(s)]yj -Fj by choosing y; under the assumption
that the output of the rest of the industry is given. Based on the outcome of this Cournot-
Nash game, firm 1 determines its optimal level of campaign contributions by maximis-
ing expected profit wi-nifs^ + w^-TCifsh) minus political outlays.
8 The overall struc-
ture of the present model is thus described by a two-stage game within the regulated
industry and a one-stage game between the competing political parties, where both
games are connected by the above Stackelberg assumption.
3. The impact of regulation on market structure and profits
Starting for explanatory reason with a given number of firms, profit maximisation yields
(n+1) reaction functions yj[yi(n,s), y2(n,s),.., y^fas), yj+1(n,s),.., yn(n,s), yn+i(n,s)].
which can be solved for the conditional Cournot-Nash-equilibrium in output:
yi{n,s) -
b(n + 2)
Note that the firms using the old technology have no incentive to spent campaign contri-
butions because any profit created by lobbing activities would be dissipated by the entry
of new firms [see OSTER 1982]. For an analysis of competing lobbying activites in the
presence of mutual entry barriers see MICHAELIS [1994].Assuming a > [(« + 2)«JbFk + 2ck(s) -ci(s)] guarantees an interior solution where the
firms' profit is given by n*:(n,s)=b-y*j(n,s)
2-Fj. Moreover, differentiating n*(n,s)
with respect s shows that firm 1 gains from a marginal tightening in regulation, i.e.
dn* (n, s) Ids > 0, if the ratio between marginal compliance cost satisfies the following
condition (see MlCHAELlS, 1994):
(3) dck(s)/ds
This condition, however, applies only if the firms in the subgroup using the old techno-
logy are protected by entry barriers like, e.g., patent rights or licensing requirements,
which ensure positive profits for any level of regulation sefs,sj. In the present analy-
sis, it is assumed that such entry barriers do not exist. Consequently, any prospect for
positive profits will attract additional competitors and the number of firms in equilib-
rium, n*(s), can be calculated from the non-profit condition n*k(s) =0 (problems con-
cerning non-integer values are neglected for simplicity):
n*(s) =
Equation (4) shows that the number of firms in the subgroup using the old technology
is c.p. the smaller a) the larger the cost differential between the two technologies is,
and b) the higherthe level of regulation is. Inserting (4) into (2) yields the conditional
Cournot-Nash-equilibrium for the case of an endogenous market structure:
(5) yl(s)=[ck(s)-c1(s)]/b +
Differentiating the accompanying profit function 7C^(s)=by*(s)
2 -F{ with respect to s
reveals that a (marginal) tightening in regulation leads to an increase in TTj (S) if:
(3
1) dck(s)/9s > dci(s)lds.Inequalities (3) and (3') can be interpreted as necessary conditions for the occurence of
strategic lobbying in the case of a fixed or an endogenous number of firms, respective-
ly. Since (3
1) is less demanding than (3), it can be concluded that the occurence of
strategic lobbying is c.p. more likely in the case of an endogenous market structure.
The rationale behind this result is straightforward because the firms in the subgroup
using the old technology are more vulnerable to a tightening in regulation if they are
not protected by entry barriers that would allow for positive profits.
However, in combining the above results with the lobbying approach introduced in the
last Section, two caveats should be recognised. First, it cannot be expected that 7i^(s)
is always monotonous in s, such that condition (3') applies only to marginal changes in
a given level of regulation, but it cannot readily be used to compare two distinct levels
Sj proposed by the two political parties. And second, if the upper bound J is sufficiently
large, political competition can lead to a level of regulation where all firms using the
old technology decide to leave the market. In this case, however, firm 1 becomes a
monopolist and the above analysis does not longer apply. In order to cope with these
problems, the remainder of the paper assumes that the firms' compliance costs can be
described by exponential functions Cj(s)=Cj-sY with c^c^ and y^l- This specification
faciliates an explicit solution to the firms' maximisation problem where the monopolisa-
tion level of regulation, s, can be calculated from n*(s)=0:
(6)
The following analysis assumes that s is feasible at least for the high regulation party,
i.e. se[sh,s]. Accounting for firm l's behaviour in the case of monopolisation, the
overall relationship between its output and the level of regulation is given by:
if s<s,
(7) y{(s) =
ifThe accompanying profit function depicted in Figure 1 shows that 7t*(s) is monotonous
increasing for s <, s. Hence, as long as s^ does not exceed the monopolisation level s,






Figure 1. The impact of regulation on the lobbying firm's profits.
4. Political equilibrium with strategic lobbying
In order to identify the optimal level of campaign contributions, firm 1 maximises ex-
pected profits wi(zh)-7C*(si) + w^(Zfl)-7i*(s/1) minus political outlays z/,. Denoting the
difference in profits under the two policiy regimes, Tt^(sh)-K^(si) by Ki(sh,S[), the
optimal level of z^ as a function of 57 is given by the following Kuhn-Tucker-condition
(see MICHAELIS, 1994):
(8) zl(sh>Sl) =
Equation (8) shows that firm l's incentive for lobbying payments is driven by the re-
spective difference in profits. However, a positive JC^S^S^) alone does not necessarilyimply z/j>0. Instead, firm 1 will spend campaign contributions only if :fL(s, ,s,) is suf-
ficiently large compared to the 'choke off-level Q (z?,z%). The latter equals the mar-
ginal productivity of the first Dollar spent on campaign contributions which, in turn,
depends on the parties' exogenous financial endowments, z?, as well as on their effi-
ciency in buying votes, x;:
9
Both parties aim at maximising their probability of election, w^ taking into account
firm 1's lobbying behaviour as described by (8) and (9). For the high regulation party,
the following relationship between w/j, s^ and 5/ can be derived from (1) and (8):
(10)
Hence, for any given programme of the low regulation party, maximising w/j requires to
maximise Tt^(sh). Party h will therefore choose the monopolisation level s which yields
the highest possible profit for firm 1 (see Figure I).
1
0 Party /, however, knows that any
payment from firm 1 to party h would deteriorate w/. Consequently, party / will move
towards party Ks equilibrium position s^ =s until the difference in profits kj(s,si)
shrinks down to the 'choke of-level Q(z°,z%), such that firm 1 has no more incentive
to spend campaign contributions.H Consequently, for any given s^, the equilibrium
position of party /, s*, satisfies the 'no payments'-condition:
(11) k(s*h,s*) = Q(zf,z°h).
Fora more detailed discussion of conditions (8) and (9) see MlCHAELIS [1994, pp. 698].
Of course, this result depends on the assumption that the monopolisation level is feasible.
In the general case party h will choose s^ = min {s,s}.
Formally, this argument can be applied to any level of regulation chosen by party h. The
uniqueness of the above quilibrium, however, is guaranteed by the parties' lexicographic
preferences as introduced in Section 2:Inserting s^ = s into condition (11) and solving for s* yields the low regulation party's
equilibrium position:
a2) s; = 2b
1/2
Condition (JL2) can be used to analyse the impact of campaign contributions on the poli-
tical equilibrium and the market structure. In the absence of external financial support
(i.e. zf=z%=0), we obtain Q(zf,z%)=Q, and condition (12) reduces to s* =s such
that both parties will propose the monopolisation level. Hence, within the framework
of the present model, political competition will inevitably lead to monopolisation if the
industry under consideration is the only source of campaign contribution. This result in-
dicates, that the existence of external financial sources like, e.g., governmental grants,
serves as an important corrective which restricts the lobbying firm's influence on the po-
litical equilibrium. For Q(zf,z£)>0, condition (12) implies s* < s such that a limited
number of firms using the old technology can stay in the market if party / wins the elec-





with c.- = C/t -q. Hence, the number of firms that would survive under the regime of
the low regulation party depends on the cost differential between the old and the new
technology, c, as well as on the absolute level of per unit cost, c/. Differentiating (13)
verifies that n*(s*) is c.p. the larger, the smaller the cost differential cis, the smaller
the absolute level of ck is, and the larger the absolute level of cj is.
A second interesting result of the above analysis relates to the amount of campaign con-
tributions de facto payed in the political equilibrium. As implied by condition (11),10
party / will move towards party h until the optimal amount of campaign contributions
spent by firm 1 shrinks down to zero. Consequently, in political equilibrium there are
no positive lobbying payments at all from the industry under consideration. Instead, the
mere threat of altering the likely outcome of the election by eventually providing finan-
cial support is sufficient to discipline both parties up to a certain degree. This outcome,
however, crucially depends on the implicite assumption that party F$ equilibrium posi-
tion,^* as described by (12) does not conflict with its ideological constraint SJ<S{.
Yet, if party / is not allowed to propose s*, it will instead choose the upper bound sj
and the optimal amount of campaign contributions spent by firm 1 is given by:
1
2





In this case, the likely impact of lobbying on the market structure is two-edged. On the
one hand, compared to the unconstrained equilibrium given by (12), party / proposes a
lower level of regulation (s[ < s^) such that a larger number of firms could survive un-
der its regime. On the other hand, however, party Fs probability of winning the election
is diminished by firm l's campaign contributions to the high regulation party. Conse-
quently, ideological constraints lead to an increased probability of monopolisation if
they prevent the low regulation party from taking up its equilibrium position.
5. Summary and extensions
The present paper has developed a model of endogenous policy making where a 'low
regulation
1 party / and a 'high regulation' party h compete for campaign contributions
spent by ra dominating low-cost firm within the regulated industry. The model shows
that assuming an endogenous market structure reinforces the economic impacts of lob-
bying activities compared to the case of a fixed number of firms as analysed by
1
2 Note that due to S[ < s* we obtain n(st 5/)> k(s>sJ)=Q(zf, z%) such that z*(S, st)>0.11
MlCHAELIS [1994]. In particular, political competition can lead to a level of regulation
where all firms using the high-cost technology decide to leave the market such that the
dominating firm becomes a monopolist. This outcome is c.p. the more likely, the lar-
ger is the cost differential between the lobbying firm and its high-cost competitors, and
the less external financial sources like, e.g., governmental grants are available to the
political parties. Moreover, ideological constraints that prevent the low regulation
party from taking up its equilibrium position will also increase the probability of mo-
nopolisation.
Of course, to most of us the idea of political parties which offer 'monopolisation for
sale' may sound somewhat exaggerated. And indeed, it seems not possible to find any
empirical example that would support such an extreme outcome as predicted by the
oversimplified model presented above. There are two routes that could be followed in
order to escape from these extreme results by introducing more reality into the model.
The first one is related to the use of more general cost functions. For example, if one
allows for differences in the slope of the cost function used above (i.e. YI * Yk) it *
s
possible to construct examples where the 71* (s) -schedule shown in Figure 1 attains a
global maximum before the monopolisation level s is reached.
1
3 In this case, firm 1
will lobby for a level of regulation which allows some of its competitors to remain in
the market.
A second - and presumably more important - modification relates to the assumption that
the proposed level of regulation has no impact on the party's probability of election ex-
cept for possible campaign contributions spent by the industry under consideration. To
some extent, this approach can be justified by the postulate that rational voters usually
are uninformed and therefore "susceptible to manipulation via election propaganda"
(URSPRUNG 1991:5). But nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that other donors of cam-
paign contributions outside the regulated industry may generally disapprove of politi-
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for this case to occur is that c^ < cjj and YI > Yk-12
cal programmes which seem too extreme to them. In order to capture this effect, one
could introduce an additional mechanism which punishes the party's in terms of re-
duced external financial support if they significantly deviate from the socially optimal
level of regulation.
1
4 In this case, zf cannot longer be viewed as exogenous, and the
parties in determining SJ have to weigh up the campaign contributions from the regu-
lated industry against the potential loss in external financial support.
Suppose, for example, the regulation under consideration requires a percentage reduction
in emissions per unit of output, e:, such that in equilibrium total emissions are given by
e*(s) = (l-s)[eiy*(s) + n*(s)-e^fs)]. In this case, the socially optimal level of regula-
tion maximises 7i%[yl(s)]+c[y*(s) + n*(s)-yl(s)]-d[e*(s)] where c[-] denotes consumers
surplus and d[-] is the damage from total emissions.13 ^WifPlHnSH' d^r, ^
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